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Abstract

This paper examines the ability of supervisory information to explain variation in
the Credit Default Swap Market. Using data from the fourth quarter of 2004 to the third
quarter of 2008, variation in CDS was able to explained well using only Call Report
Data. These Call Report data that are proxies for credit risk, leverage risk, and liquidity
risk are found to be significant in at least one model. There is evidence of both omitted
variables and heteroskedasticity in both models. Further work that controls for the
movements in related markets, namely the equities market, and the use of
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors or Generalized Least Squares is needed.
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I. Introduction
The Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market was a rapidly growing credit derivative
market from 2000 until late 2007. During the recent liquidity crisis, origination of several
types of securities has essentially halted, making fewer bonds available for CDS
protection. Expansion and liquidity increases of the markets in recent years are, at least
in some part, due to the increased utilization of CDS. CDS allow a firm or individual to
reduce its exposure to the credit risk of a bond or loan, and as such, CDS have become an
effective diversification tool. The Federal Reserve, along with other regulatory
institutions, is now using CDS spreads as a financial, off-site surveillance instrument for
banks. The concept and ability of the market to predict rating changes by the Federal
Reserve is explored.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses relevant
background information; Section III reviews relevant literature; Section IV presents the
methodology; Section V discusses the results and findings; Section VI concludes.

II. Background Information
Credit Default Swaps are bilateral contracts in which credit risk from an asset,
called the underlying reference entity, is exclusively traded from one party to another.
Most commonly, the underlying asset is a bond; occasionally, the asset may be a loan.
CDS are generally considered to be analogous to insurance. A protection buyer pays
periodic payments to the protection seller for this protection. These payments are
annualized percentages of the notional value of the underlying reference entity, or the par
value. . These payments could be broken up through out the year or paid in one lump
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payment at the end of the year; the most common choice is quarterly payments. The
price of the CDS is called the spread and is quoted in basis points. One basis point equals
1/100 of one percent. CDS premiums, or spreads, are measures of credit risk. When
CDS premiums increase, the rise in price is interpreted as the risk of the underlying asset
has increased. One would expect higher spreads on an underlying asset that is more
likely to default or enact a credit event or having a higher loss given default.
The CDS premiums continue until maturity of the underlying reference entity,
default or another "credit event" or the contract of the CDS ends. The five events usually
included in the contract that give rise to compensation by the seller are: if the reference
entity fails to meet payment obligations when they are due; bankruptcy; acceleration or
obligation default; material adverse restructuring of debt; repudiation. If the underlying
reference entity goes into default or another credit event occurs, the protection seller
compensates the protection buyer for their losses. This compensation is done in one of
two ways: the settlement occurs at par value either by delivery of the asset (essentially,
the protection seller buys the underlying reference entity) or the notional amount minus
the post-market value determined by auction or a dealer poll.
Once a credit event or the contract expires, the CDS is terminated and all
payments cease. If the contract ends without a credit event, a new CDS can be purchased
on the same underlying reference entity. If an underlying reference entity is fully paid
the insurance payments continue even though the underlying reference entity no longer
has any credit default risk, until the CDS reaches maturity. By far, the most used term of
CDS is 5 years, and it is considered to be the de facto standard. In the over-the-counter
(OTC) contract, protection sellers are compensated at the beginning of the contract if the

l

underlying asset is deemed especially risky. The OTC contract stipulates that for swaps
with spreads over 500 basis points, or five percent, the portion of all payments that would
have been over the 500 basis point threshold are discounted for time and paid upfront (the
present value of those values is paid upfront). All post-initial periodic protection
payments are paid at 500 basis points.
Investors in the CDS market must be very wary though. The CDS market is not
regulated, there are no standard contracts (though there is an OTC contract that is widely
used), there are no capital requirements for the insurance seller, and there are no standard
ways of valuing the CDS themselves. There is also no formal exchange or index to
access CDS prices easily. Due to this, only a limited number of vendors have historic
CDS data. Also, there is an active secondary CDS market, so both the actual protection
buyer and the protection seller can change several times through the life of the swap.
Notifying the other party is not required and, as such, is rarely done. This practice has
lead a number of analysts to doubt about the resilience of this market should a systematic
issue creep up that requires a large number of settlements in a short period.
Another large issue is counterparty default risk. Hand in hand with no capital
requirements, knowledge of the counter party's ability to pay given a credit event is
usually not directly revealed. Also, CDS give no authority to request information about
the financial stability or integrity of the counterparty. Pricing this counterparty default
risk can be extremely difficult since the actual party can change at anytime, yet the
premium that is to be paid, as stipulated by the contract, does not. During and following
the credit crunch in the fall of 2007, counterparty risk in CDS became a much larger
factor. Firms, such as AIG, were seen as having become much more risky as

counterparties due to a lack ofliquidity to pay should a credit event occur. Eventually,
CDS spreads returned to near pre-fall 2007 spread levels but this process took several
months.
►

Many are advocating direct government regulation ofthe credit default swap
market or the formation ofa formal exchange with standardized contracts. This
regulation and/or exchange would allow for many ofthe above issues to be resolved in
future CDS contacts rather easily. Also, the formation ofa formal exchange would
reduce the information costs ofdetermining the current CDS on a particular entity, both
in terms ofmoney and time.

A large responsibility ofregulatory institutions is the monitoring ofthe financial
condition ofthe entities it supervises and enforcing legislation when required. Bank
supervisors, including the Federal Reserve System (or more commonly, the Fed),
represent the current financial status ofbanks with a rating acronym called a CAMELS
rating and Bank Holding Companies (BHC) as BOPEC (until 2005). These ratings are
meant to capture the health and stability ofthe institution in a single, simple statistic.
These ratings affect the actions that the Federal Reserve takes in reaction to changes in
the banks condition (e.g. a bank in good standing is more likely to be allowed to pursue
an action than a bank in worse standing). The ability ofthe Federal Reserve and bank
examiners to predict these ratings changes, especially downgrades, so that the Fed may
take preemptive actions is considered one ofthe holy grails ofsupervision
The on site examinations that determine the ratings usually occur about once a
year. During that time, a bank's balance sheets and loan make up can materially change,

which may lead to a different rating. So quarterly, banks are required to submit key
accounting information from their balance sheets to the Federal Reserve in what's called
a Call Report. These Call Reports have data on statistics that bank examiners use to get a
general feel for the current condition of the bank, without having to bear the cost of an on
site examination. These statistics include measures of credit risk, leverage risk and
liquidity risk; these three risks could all play a key role in the CDS market. The majority
of the signal strength of the CDS should imply to the risks of the firm and, in particular,
mostly credit risk. In the very short run though, liquidity risks can be credit risks (i.e.
when are does not have enough liquidity to pay its debts). In the longer run, leverage risk
·could lead to credit risk. If a firm is too highly levered and their investments default, the
firm may not have enough capital to pay its debt. These Call Report data are just proxies
for a bank's credit, liquidity and leverage risks, as such, their explanatory power may be
limited.
Another source of information on a bank's condition is their security market
information. A bank that must increase the yield on their debt is perceived as more risky
to investors in the bond market. Similar deductions can be made about the CDS market.
So, examiners use security market information in lieu of Call Report data or on site
examinations, between examinations, since security market information can be found
daily. Implicitly, the Federal Reserve assumes that these market indicators imply some
information about the current financial condition and some predictive power concerning
the future outlook of the bank.

III. Literature Review
Norden and Weber (2004) and Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) examine the
effect of ratings announcements on the CDS market. Norden and Weber test the reaction
of the stock market and the CDS market to credit rating changes from Standard and
Poor's, Fitch, and Moody's. The data set used, from 2000 to 2002, is limited in its
breadth. They find that Moody's and S&P ratings changes were predicted by both
markets. It is also found that the number of previous rating events and the level of the
old credit rating affect the magnitude of the response. There is observed significant
abnormal performance for both the pre-event window and the event window for negative
news in both markets; they do not find significant post-announcement day effects. Also,
they find that the magnitude of a review for downgrade in both markets is larger than it is
for the downgrade itself. It is also found that the CDS predicts annoucements earlier than
the stock market. They conclude that the CDS is more efficient than the stock market,
but that both markets' reactions are consistent with EMH.
Hull, Predescu, and White find that the CDS market is able to predict downgrades
from up to 90 days before the actual downgrade, while the CDS market is able to predict
reviews for downgrades up to 30 days before the announcement. They find, in a 10-day
post-announcement window, that there are not statistically significant changes for
negative events. This leads to the conclusion that the CDS market efficiently responds to
information.
Greatrex (2008a) examines the stock market's and the CDS market's response to
earning announcements from 2001 to 2006. She finds that "the CDS market anticipates
the direction of the earnings surprise; prices begin to adjust up to 90 days prior at the

actual announcement date" (20). It is also found that negative news has a stronger
response than positive news and size of the response is proportional to the size of the
news. Credit quality stratifies the results: lower credit firms generally having more
economically and statistically significant spread changes. She finds that there is some
evidence, with positive news, of a post-announcement drift and that the market tends to
overreact with negative news. She finds that in general the CDS, although with minor
inefficiency, is no less efficient than the stock market.
Gilber, Meyer and Vaughan (2002) examine the usefulness of Jumbo Certificates
of Deposit (CD) in bank surveillance. "They construct proxies for default premiums and
deposit runoffs and then rank banks based on these risk proxies. (Gilbert, Meyer,
Vaughan 2000)" These proxies attempt to control for credit risk, leverage risk, liquidity
risk, among other factors. Also, they construct a logit model that mimics off-site
surveillance models to rank banks. The rankings are compared and it is found that there
is no improvement in the Jumbo CD model as compared to the logit model. They
conclude that the use of market information adds no additional value to off-site
surveillance.
IV. Data and Methodology

Daily CDS data were collected from Markit from quarter four of 2004 to quarter
three of 2008. The CDS data was converted to quarterly data by finding the arithmetic
mean in each quarter, this allows it to fit with other data easier. Five-year contract CDS
were used from 12 banks with reported CDS. While many more than these 12 banks
have CDS, their CDS are not traded sufficiently for accurate and consistent data. Also,
data was limited to CDS with underlying assets underwritten in US Dollars and with a

modified restructuring clause (this clause is considered standard in trading in America).
The average CDS in 2004 for these 12 banks was 19 basis points; while in 2008, the
average CDS was 140. Also, the standard deviation in 2004 was 6 basis points; while in
2008, it had risen to 187 basis points. The median CDS also had risen from 19 basis
points in 2004 to 99 basis points in 2008.
Call Report data was collected from the Federal Reserve in the same time periods
as the CDS data. Total Assets (TA) is the total assets a bank has in a particular quarter.
The larger a bank, the chance of default should be risked as smaller, ceteris paribus, so I
expect a negative sign. Return on Assets (RoA) is net income as a percentage of total
assets. As a bank earns more income, they should be more able to pay their debt, all else
held constant; I expect a negative sign. Past is the ratio of loans in 30 days past due to
total assets. If a bank has more delinquent loans than another, the bank with more
delinquent loans is perceived as not judging risk as well, all else held constant; I predict a
positive sign. Non-accrual is the ratio of loans in non-accrual status to total assets. In a
similar fashion to Past, banks with more non-accruing loans are perceived as not judging
risk as well, ceteris paribus. A positive sign is predicted. Commercial is the ratio of
commercial and industrial loans to total assets. Commercial loans are riskier than other
loan types. A bank with more commercial loans would be perceived as riskier, ceteris
paribus. I predict a positive sign. Residential is the ratio of residential real estate to total
assets. Residential is less risky than most other lending options to a bank, as such, a bank
with more residential loans would be seen as less risky, all else held constant. A negative
sign is predicted. Other Real Estate Owned (OREO) is primarily seized collateral from
delinquent loans. Banks that have made more bad loans and have had to seize more
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collateral or banks who are not as good at liquidating seized collateral would be thought

I_

of as worse judges of risk, ceteris paribus. I predict a positive sign. Equity, the equity of
the bank divided by the total assets of the bank, allows a bank to weather times of poor
income. All else held constant, a bank with more equity would be more able to pay their
debt; I expect a negative sign. Securities, the value of the securities the bank holds
divided by total assets, are a measure of the liquidity of the bank. The more liquid a bank
is or the more securities a bank holds, they are perceived as being less risky. A negative
sign is predicted. M is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank's management rating
(the M in CAMELS) is worse than its composite CAMELS rating (else zero). Banks
whose management rating is worse than its composite CAMELS rating are seen as
having poor management (by examiners), even if the bank is doing well. If the
examiners are correct, eventually the poor management would make decision that make
the bank worse off than a better management team, ceteris paribus. So, a positive sign is
predicted.
Model 1 is defined as follows:

(1)

11 bank specific dummy variables, designed to capture otherwise immeasurable
idiosyncrasies of the individual bank were added to form Model 2. In all other respects,
Model 2 is the same as Model 1. As such, for fear of too much repetition, Model 2 's
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definition is suppressed (see appendix). No prediction is made about the sign of any of
the bank specific dummy variables.

V. Findings and Results
Model 1 was a fairly good fit with an adjusted R2 of .62 (see appendix for full
synopsis). Since the absolute value of the t-statistic was greater than the critical-t, I was
able to reject the null hypothesis that the beta for RoA, Non-accrual, Commercial,
OREO, Equity, and Securities are each (individually) zero. I find that one unit increase
in RoA yields a 74 basis point decrease in CDS (ceteris paribus). Additionally, a one unit
change in OREA changes CDS by 462 basis points. Since the critical-t was greater than
the absolute value of the t-statistic for TA, Past, Residential (although close with a P
value of .102) and M, I failed to reject the null hypothesis that their betas were
(individually) zero. Also, the model as a whole passes the F-test (which tests the
significance of the entire equation) with a F-statistic of 33. As such, I can reject the null
that all the betas are zero, so the equation as a whole is significant.
Model 1 fails the Ramsey RESET test, which tests for omitted variables, as I can
reject the null that there are no omitted variables. Explanations for this could include that
CDS spreads are also based on counter-party risk, which is impossible to measure. Also,
market movements (such as the equity market) are not being taken into account. Model I
also fails the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity as I can reject the
null hypothesis that there is constant variance. Using a larger data set, modeling with
General Least Squares (GLS) or using Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
(HCSE) are possible areas for further work. After running Variance Inflation Factor
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(VIF) tests, it is found that the highest VIF is OREO with 6.33. Since that statistic is
below 10 and since the mean VIF is 2.78, the likelihood ofmulticollinearity is low.
Model 2 is a slight improvement to Model 1, with an adjusted R 2 of .66, even
though none ofthe bank specific dummy variables are significant (see appendix for full
synopsis). RoA, Non-accrual, and OREO all remain significant. In addition, TA and
Past become significant. Unfortunately, Commercial, Securities, M, and Residential fail
to pass the T-test and are not significant. As stated above, none ofthe bank specific
dummy variables are found to be significant.
Model 2 also fails the Ramsey RESET test, as I can reject the null. Similar
solutions exist here as with Model 1. Model 2 also failed the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook
Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, as I can reject the null. A similar set ofremedies
exists here as with Model 1. VIF tests are not run for Model 2 as the dummy variables
can result in a misleading statistic.

VI. Conclusion
This paper examines the ability ofsupervisory data to explain variation in
quarterly CDS data. While CDS have been growing rapidly since 2001, the variation in
the CDS was able to explained well using only Call Report Data. These Call Report data
that are proxies for credit risk, leverage risk, and liquidity risk are found to be significant
in at least one model. In addition, the use ofGLS or HCSE is required to control for
heteroskedasticity. A possible omitted effect is that ofrelated markets, namely the
equities market. Further work is needed to test that hypothesis.
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Model 1:
CDSit = f3o + f31 TAit + f32R0Ai1 + f33Pasti1 + f34Non-accrualit + f3sCommercialit +

-�

Model 2:
CDSit = f3o + f31TAit + f32R0Ait + f33Pasti1 + f34Non-accruali1 + f3sCommercialit +

f320Bankl0 + f321Bankll + Eit•

Model 1 Regression Results:
Variable
TA
RoA
Past
Non-Accrual
Commercial
Residential
OREO
Equity
Securities
M
Constant

Coefficient
-l.48e-12
-.0074326
-.0014181
.0063058
-.018762
-.0001024
.0462164
.0008667
.000215
.0002121
.0010033

Observations

192

F-statistic
Proc > F

33.27
0.0000

Adjusted Rl

0.6282

Standard Error
l.23e-12
.0008784
.0013578
.0023872
.0103714
.0000623
.0139444
.0004451
.0000792
.0027299
.0044535

T-statistic•
-1.20
-8.46
-1.04
2.64
-1.81
-1.64
3.31
1.95
2.71
0.08
0.23

P Value
.232
0.00
0.298
0.009
0.072
0.102
0.001
0.053
0.007
0.938
0.822

Model 1 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity Results:

I

Chi2(1)
Prob> Chi2

11763.58
0.0000

Model 1 Ramsey RESET test for Omitted Variables:

I F(3, 178)
Prob> F

Model 1 VIF Tests Results:

Variable
OREO
Past
Non-Accrual
RoA
Residential
Equity
Commercial
Securities
TA
M
Mean

217.87
1
0.0000

VIF
6.33
4.40
4.36
2.44
2.32
1.85
1.67
1.49
1.29
1.15

2.78

l

Model 2 Regression Results:

Variable
TA
RoA
Past
Non-Accrual
Commercial
Residential
OREO
Equity
Securities
M
Bankl
Bank2
Bank3
Bank4
Bank5
Bank.6
Bank7
Bank8
Bank9
Bankl0
Bank.11
Constant

Coefficient
-9.53e-12
-.0087185
-.0041329
.0082026
-.014882
-.0000519
.0471729
.0003957
.0002249
.0008431
-.0010034
-.0045837
-.0042937
-.0079838
-.0048438
-.0070509
.0046345
.0024686
.0014723
-.005729
-.0052095
.0123343

F-statistic
Proc> F

18.90
0.0000

Observations

I
I

Adjusted R'�

192

Standard Error
5.67e-12
.0010682
.0019645
.0027401
·.0118941
.0001218
.0155107
.0005292
.0001878
.0029808
.0067504
.0060748
.0061553
.0057489
.0049255
.006015
.0027795
.004698
.0047155
.0059701
.0061693
.00872

0.6631

T-statistic
-1.68
-8.16
-2.10
2.99
-1.25
-0.43
3.04
0.75
1.20
0.28
-0.15
-0.75
-0.70
-1.39
-0.98
-1.17
1.67
0.53
0.31
-0.96
-0.84
1.41

P Value
0.095
0.000
0.037
0.003
0.213
0.670
0.003
0.456
0.233
0.778
0.882
0.452
0.486
0.167
0.327
0.243
0.097
0.600
0.755
0.339
0.400
0.159

Model 2 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity Results:

chi2(21)
Prob> chi2

12320.44
0.0000

F(3, 167)
Prob> F

265.04
1
0.0000

Model 2 Ramsey RESET test for Omitted Variables:

